It's complicated. (That's why this is the longest post I've ever written - and that's saying something!) And yet, it's not all that complicated. As gb2000ie said, we are all linked together in this. The consumers, the financial houses, and the institutions that have billions of dollars to save for the future.
The Background
Once upon a time (starting in the late 1990's) there began an exponential increase in the amount of money that big institutions all around the world were saving. Money from China, Russia, and India was pouring into the financial system for the first time. In a few years there was nearly twice as much money being saved and invested as in, say, the 1980's. This isn't your family savings - this is big institutional investors like pension funds, national banks, and insurance companies.
All this money needed to be invested safely (not in risky things like stocks), but money mangers still needed to get some return on their savings. That is what determined their professional reputation - getting a reasonable profit, without losing any of their clients money. The problem was, there was more money looking for a safe harbor than there were things to put the money in.
Traditionally the safest investment was US Treasury bonds - low interest, but very safe. But in the early 2000's Alan Greespan kept Treasury interest rates low; good for borrowers, but bad for investors. So, the money managers kept looking for something that would pay better than Treasuries. But the number of safe investments were limited, and there was more and more money trying to get into them.
The Bright Idea
Then someone in the financial industry was inspired. What investment is safer than home mortgages? The housing market was going up much faster than Treasuries, and the default rate was very low - so it was overall a reasonably secure market. But individual mortgages are tiny - much to small to be useful when you have a billion dollars to manage for a client.
Then came the "Aha!" moment. What if instead of dealing with individual homes, we were to bundle thousands of home mortgages together and sell them as a security? Investor clients would have all the advantages of the home market (fast rising value and low default rate) without the disadvantages of having to manage a bunch of monthly payments from homeowners! And thus was born the Mortgage Backed Security.
The financial firms put the deals together, called up home mortgage lenders and bought all the "paper", the ownership of the mortgage debt. They paid the home mortgage companies very well to take these loans off their hands. This was the ultimate win-win-win situation:
- Institutional investors jumped at the chance to get 5% - 6% return on their invested money. (Alan Greespan was only paying them 1%.)
- Financial houses had a new hot product to sell.
- Mortgage companies got cash now, instead of having to wait for the mortgage to be paid off in 30 years. Plus they no longer had the risk of default - that was passed on to the new owners.
Everyone was happy. Until around 2003. There are only so many mortgages to buy. The investors called the financiers: "We need more of these MBS investments. We'll even pay you
more to put them together! The financiers called the mortgage brokers: "We need more mortgages. We'll even pay you more money for them!" The mortgage brokers called the real estate agencies: "We need more loans - we'll give your clients even better terms!". The real estate people told the prospective home buyers: "Now is the time to buy. The value of the house will only increase, and I can get you even better terms on a loan!"
"Yes!" said the homebuyers. "Yes!" said the loan companies. "Yes!" said the financiers. "More!" said the investors. Because more and more big investment money was coming into the system from new economies, the demand only got bigger.
The Turning Point
By 2005 pretty much everyone in the US who qualified for a loan was in a home. The new loans slowed down. But the demand up the food chain was only increasing. "Get us more mortgages! We'll pay you even more!" cried the financial houses to the loan companies.
What to do? The mortgage companies then made a calculation. Since the investment firms will pay us even more money, we can adjust our calculation for what qualifies as a risky loan. For the first time, it made financial sense to reduce the qualifications for a loan, since their money was now being made by selling loans to Wall Street, not in managing home mortgages for 30 years. And it was a calculation that really had no downside for the loan companies, since the paper was quickly sold off they no longer had any risk that they would be stuck with a bad loan. That was now someone else's problem.
So, it became easier and easier to qualify for a home loan. "Hurray!" said home buyers, real estate agents, loan companies, financial firms, and institutional investors. Every few months, some loan company would take the requirements even lower. Then the others would have to follow suit to stay competitive.
Meanwhile, in another part of the forest...
At the financial firms, in another part of the building, another group got a bright idea of a new product to sell. Risk makes everyone nervous - especially the big institutional investors (insurance companies, pension funds, etc.). They want to make money, but the one thing that they
absolutely cannot do is lose money. So financial firms come up with a way to take away risk that comes from more profitiable investments. They will personally guarantee that investors can recover their money - for a monthly percentage of course. These guarantees are called collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). And what makes them even more safe is that they are backed by another investment house (for a fee, naturally).
This makes sense to the investors, because even with the fee, they are still making more money than in more stable securities. And they are risk-free, since the worst case scenario is that an investment goes bad + the financial firm fails - in which case the partner investment house would pay out the CDO.
The customer is happy and making money, and the CDO is essentially free income every month for the investment house partners. Once again it's win-win-win.
This catches on, and soon everyone is selling them and guaranteeing each other's transactions.
Asleep at the wheel?
What about regulators? The Federal Reserve, SEC, the FDIC, the rating agencies? The Fed was primarily concerned with containing inflation and recession. The .COM collapse and the 9/11 economic hits were their main focus, and they were trying to steer the economy out of that. The SEC regulates stocks, and the FDIC regulates banks.
These investment houses (Bear Stearns, Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, etc.) are not banks and their investments are not publicly traded. Any of these agencies could have claimed some jurisdiction if they wanted to push it - but certainly not in the pro-business Bush administration. (And not during the Clinton administration, either.)
And besides that, there was nothing wrong that anyone could see. As a matter of fact, business looked brisk and healthy.
The rating agencies, (Standard and Poors, Moody), rated the mortgage backed securities as AAA, their highest rating, equivalent to US Treasury Bonds. That was because all their spreadsheets that analyzed the history of mortgages said that the default rate was traditionally very low.
Of course, what they weren't taking into account was that the loan standards were falling by the month - and the "traditional" default rate was soon going to be irrelevant.
The other shoe drops
So as they financial engine roared ahead, everyone was making money and the smart people (i.e., everyone but the homeowners) were also hedging their bets, so profits were high and risk seemed low.
Then something happened. It was hardly unexpected - housing prices stopped rising in late 2006. Then housing prices started to fall in 2007. It's a simple matter of supply and demand. Even with rock-bottom loan qualifications there are only so many people that want to buy a house. "House flipping" had practically become a sport. (It did become several TV shows.) Speculators were building condos everywhere. Rows of McMansions were pushing into farm lands far outside cities. Supply finally exceeded demand.
Suddenly speculators with multiple properties were stuck with them. And they were counting a quick buck, not having to pay back months of payments on houses no one wanted anymore. They went broke. They defaulted (many walked away) from their mortgages.
Next hit were the homeowners that had signed on for baloon payments, based on the idea that they could refinance since the home would be worth more when the payment became due. Not only was the house not worth more - it was worth less. They owed more than the home was currently worth (they were "under water"). They defaulted.
This was just a sad local story until the ac
ulated effect sapped the profits of the big institutional investors at the top of the food chain. Remember them? The people who absolutely could not risk losing money? Well, they were now losing money, and they wanted OUT. NOW.
No only that, they now invoked those investment guarantees. But the financial firms were highly leveraged themselves; they didn't keep that kind of cash on hand. This threatened to bring them down. They invoked the partner CDOs that they had with other firms. Who also were highly leveraged and didn't have the money. All of a sudden this invisible web of mutual guarantees and giant losses started moving through the industry all over the world.
Collapse
Bear Stearns had to face the collapse of it's mortgage backed hedge funds in the summer of 2007, and struggled for months to borrow, restructure and stay afloat, but suc
bed in the spring of 2008. It was sold to JP Morgan Stanley for $10 a share. (Weeks earlier it was valued at $133/ share.) Lehman Brothers was next. US Fed officials tried to arrange a private bail out to prevent further collapse, but stopped short of using federal funds. They couldn't prevent it from going under - it was too easy to bet against the firms survival (short selling) and for speculators to make profits on its demise.
The dominoes were falling. Almost every financial institution, whether they were a bank, insurance company, pension fund, or investment firm either owned, or were on the hook for CDOs and Mortgage securities. No firm trusted anyone else because there was no way to know what "toxic assets" they had on their books. Everyone had their own crises to deal with, so no financial institution wanted to lend to an ailing firm.
The free market was about to strangle itself to death.
Government to the rescue
The only actor big enough to do a anything were the US and other governments. Emergency plans were made. There was no provision that allowed the US government to own or intervene in private firms. Legislation was quickly passed that gave the US Treasury some legal cover, learning the lesson from the failure of Lehman Brothers, they stepped in started buying up all the "toxic assets" in order to insure to investors that they could lend to financial firms without the risk of owning some unknown amount of bad debt.
European countries did what they could, but since the European Union does not have a unified financial system and most financial firms are global, there was not a lot they could individually do.
The US continued pumping money into financials as the Bush administration ended and the Obama administration began. Some were bought, but major meltdown was avoided.
Bankruptcy, Unemployment, Recession
Down at the bottom of the food chain, businesses found it impossible to get loans. Banks were risk-averse, and wanted to hold on to cash because there were so many unknown pitfalls. Since businesses couldn't expand, or in some cases even do day-to-day business, they failed or stagnated. This led to lay-offs. Which led to more mortgage defaults. Which led to even tighter credit. Which led to a drop in consumer spending. Which led to business stagnation - and the cycle continued over and over.
The economy ground to a halt.
The moral of the story
We are well into and out of the recession now, but the economy is still like molasses. In addition, we see now that the boom years covered up some trends that are now inescapable.
- The housing market as a whole is dead until all the bad loans and foreclosures are cleared out. We are still quite a way from that point.
- Manufacturing and unskilled labor has moved irrevocably out of the developed western countries. It's not coming back, no matter how many "Made in the USA" or "Buy British" campaigns are run. That means many blue collar workers currently out of work, will never work again.
- The self-regulating free market is a myth. There is no incentive to fix a system where one party makes the profit while another holds all the risk. Capitalism assumes that business will avoid unprofitable risk. But our systems have become too sophisticated for their own good.
I am sure there many other lessons can be drawn, and their are many views of the way to go forward. (Please share yours.)
But this (admittedly very long - congratulations for making it this far) story is how we got to where we are.
Place blame where you will.